WEMIX$ Stablecoin Exploit -- Case File

Incident: July 26, 2026 at 09:17:28 UTC (18:17 KST) · Network: WEMIX3.0 Mainnet

Case file v3.11 Technical path closed H12 residual open Attribution open Explorers + official blog

Technical path: closed on explorers + official WEMIX blog (mint path, amounts, helpers, bridges, containment). Still open (attribution only): CEX legal name, attacker real-world identity. Those need Foundation / exchange KYC / law enforcement, not more chain math.

This is an independent case reconstruction, not an official Foundation post-mortem. Primary data sources (always): (1) block explorers : WEMIX explorer, Etherscan, BscScan : for addresses, txs, logs, and balances; (2) official WEMIX blog / communication posts for Foundation numbers and response measures. Secondary (optional): reputed news articles only to cross-check public reporting : never as proof of on-chain facts. Function selector names may collide; treat names as likely and behavior as confirmed on explorers. Re-verify primary claims on explorer + official blog before treating as settled.

The Case in Brief

Bottom line

Net +5,225,525 WEMIX$ minted; realized $724,198.27 USDC.e and 30,736 WEMIX net. Matches Foundation figures. Full exit path: see Money flow.

How

The helpers' proxy setup path was never locked. Anyone who found it could claim Ownable on the minting authority. EIP-1967 proxies, not WEMIX$ owner-key theft. Stack diagram: Architecture.

Who

Signer EOA 0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 linked; person unknown. Gas via exchange distribution (~$5).

Status

Token-side mint revoked (isWhitelist=0 on helpers). Router still proxy Ownable. H12 Proxy Admin residual remains open: see Open residual risk.

Proxy Architecture

VAULT and Secondary Helper are EIP-1967 transparent proxies (identical 2,112-byte proxy bytecode). Mint logic lives in different implementations. Ownable lives in proxy storage. Shared Proxy Admin can upgrade either implementation.

WEMIX$ Token  [isWhitelist on helper proxy addresses]
     ^ mint/burn
VAULT Proxy (2,112 B)  Ownable=Router  -->  Impl A 0xbddd41457b55710fd0055b1cfbbc0b9be77a89c4 (16,443 B)
     ^ upgrade
Proxy Admin 0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9 (nonce 1)
     v upgrade
0x01fa Proxy (2,112 B)  Ownable=Router  -->  Impl B 0x002ceee5624f60fee129549ffa6805a5ee49c759 (7,783 B)

Proxies: VAULT 0xd2947dbfdbdbb99702de6e46c63cb1968e21d95b · 0x01fa 0x01fa6cc8cd2f99b30e19d599fc002c3f2cac3d76 · Router 0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2. Earlier drafts incorrectly called the 2,112-byte code the full mint implementation.

Data sources (policy)

Primary (authoritative for this case file): chain explorers + official WEMIX blog.
Secondary (context only): reputed news when helpful for parent-company context or public narrative : never replaces explorer or official blog for numbers or mechanism.

Primary : chain explorers

WEMIX explorer : WEMIX3.0 txs, WEMIX$, helpers, CCIP, balances
Etherscan : Ethereum legs after bridge out
BscScan : BNB Smart Chain legs
Key txs: 0xfed2172a508d84f63b56acc7e3c30164930220004f808799998b8201fe7cefe0 · 0x5afa080282756fa24ce725ff0da2913e5d1eb5badcf83596f91257aad4f768e8 · 0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH] · 0x8e81fcc2d4a3baa0ee9044e0d7e36f59c9bba9c1

Primary : official WEMIX blog

Regarding the WEMIX$ Security Issue and Ongoing Investigation (26 Jul 2026) : initial notice; ownership of a WEMIX$ contract may have been compromised
Update on the WEMIX$ Security Issue and Response Measures (26-27 Jul 2026) : 18:17 UTC+9; ~5,225,525 WEMIX$ issued; 30,736 WEMIX + 724,198.27 USDC.e; ETH + BSC bridges; CEX deposits; freezes requested; services suspended
Play Bridge Exploit and the Foundation's Responses (Mar 2025) : prior incident contrast only

Secondary : reputed news (optional cross-check)

The Crypto Times : recaps official figures; parent Wemade / second-incident context
Yahoo Finance : same official numbers; bridge/service suspension quotes
Chosun Biz : Korean parent-company framing (Wemade, ~7.7bn KRW)

Addresses are labeled analytically (for example, Suspected CEX sink) unless an explorer shows an official name tag or the WEMIX blog names the entity. Do not treat analytical labels as accusations against any person or business. All address claims are hyperlinked to WEMIX explorer, Etherscan, or BscScan for independent verification.

Alignment: Official blog amounts and timeline match explorer reconstruction. Official phrase “ownership of a WEMIX$-related contract was compromised” aligns with helper proxy Ownable takeover on explorers : not proof that the WEMIX$ token owner() key was stolen. Parent company: Wemade (Korean-listed gaming publisher; WEMIX / WEMIX PLAY ecosystem).

Hypotheses -- What We Investigated and Found

#	Theory	Verdict	Why
H1	Helper proxies left with callable initialize / reinitializer	PROVEN	VAULT and 0x01fa are EIP-1967 proxies (identical 2,112-byte proxy code; different implementations). See Architecture. Pre-exploit likely-name `isWhitelist`(VAULT/0x01fa)=1; Router=0. Exploit emitted Initialized + OwnershipTransferred on both proxies: attacker set Ownable in proxy storage via setup through the proxy. Behavior confirmed on explorers.
H2	The WEMIX$ owner private key was stolen	IMPRECISE	The WEMIX$ token's top-level owner key was never used (nonce 0, zero balance, not on the minter whitelist). But privileged access to helper contracts WAS taken through their unlocked setup function. News headlines saying "owner key breach" describe a real privilege compromise but attribute it to the wrong mechanism. It was a configuration error, not a key theft. Both "the token owner key was safe" and "privileged access was compromised" are true.
H3	The attacker bypassed the daily conversion limit	TRUE but not the bug	WEMIX$ has a user-facing Module with a 3-per-day limit. The attacker never used the Module. They called the token directly through the helper contracts. The Module worked fine -- the attacker just ignored it.
H4	Chainlink CCIP bridge was the attack entry point	NO	Zero CCIP calls in the exploit transaction. CCIP was only used to send money OUT to Ethereum after the exploit. It was the exit door, not the entry.
H5	A recent network outage caused the exploit	NO	WEMIX had a block production halt on July 19, but it was a speed issue fixed the same day. No contract changes happened. WEMIX$ is not a proxy and cannot be upgraded.
H6	A flash loan or MEV bot was used	NO	The attacker used their own money ($5 of gas from an exchange). No borrowed funds, no flash loan patterns in the logs.
H7	Supply-chain / stolen-key reuse from Feb 2025 NILE leak	OPEN / SCOPED	Not July root cause (that is unlocked initialize). No public 2025 attacker addresses to compare. Promote only if key reuse or shared funding graph is proven.
H8	Same actor or collusion with Feb 2025	UNRESOLVABLE PUBLICLY	Needs disclosed 2025 attacker set or LE/KYC. Gas funder is exchange infrastructure, which weakens but does not refute off-chain collusion.
H9	Breaker role was the exploit entry	NO (as root)	Attack used helper initialize + whitelist mint, not Breaker. Breaker remains an unmapped residual control surface (pause/emergency powers unknown without source).
H10	Other residual isWhitelist minters still dangerous	CONTAINED (helpers)	VAULT and 0x01fa: isWhitelist was 1 pre-exploit, 0 now. Sample of related DEX/CCIP contracts also 0. Full historical mapping scan still ideal but not required for this incident path.
H11	Attacker found helpers via on-chain recon (hunting), not insider tip	OPEN / PLAUSIBLE	For recon: Transfer watch + likely-name `isWhitelist` + EIP-1967 slot + initialize probe is trivial on a public chain. Against polished insider: 3 failed deploys, exchange-funded fresh EOA, Proxy Admin never used. Verdict: OPEN / PLAUSIBLE. Evidence weights toward independent recon; does not prove discovery method. Not a courtroom claim.
H12	Proxy Admin key residual upgrade risk	OPEN residual risk	Shared admin `0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9` (nonce 1, 0 WEMIX) can upgrade VAULT and 0x01fa implementations. Impl/admin unchanged during exploit. isWhitelist fix is token-side; a malicious upgrade could change helper logic. Recommendation: Foundation confirm custody and rotate to multisig. Not evidence the key is lost or stolen.

The Numbers

5,225,525

WEMIX$ Created (Net)

$724,198

USDC.e Stolen (Realized)

30,736

WEMIX Converted (Net)

24 min

Funding to Exploit

Attacker Transactions

$6.25M

Network Impact Estimate

Foundation figure: face value / TVL impact, not realized theft

Headlines citing $5.2M-$6.25M reflect mint face value or network impact. Realized outflow traced on explorers: about $724,198 USDC.e.

The Attacker

Attack Wallet

Label	Attacker / Signer EOA
Address	0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]
First seen	Block 118,822,162 -- July 26, 08:52:59 UTC
Funded by	Gas Funder (exchange distribution) `0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3`
Funding amount	23.746 WEMIX (about $5, just for gas)
Final balance	0.0 WEMIX (everything moved out)
Total transactions	37 (nonces 0 through 36)
Identified by	Publicly flagged on July 26; verify on WEMIX explorer
Real-world identity	Attribution open (not a technical gap). Wallet is fully mapped on explorers. Gas came via exchange distribution, so someone had an exchange account, but explorers cannot name the person. Closes only with funding-CEX KYC or law enforcement.

Threat profile (analytical, not identity)

Independent operator; on-chain behavior consistent with a solo actor. Analytical assessment of on-chain behavior; not attribution of a person.

Setup: public recon path to unlocked proxy initialize is feasible
Execution: Router debugged on mainnet (~3.4 min of failed deploys)
Exit: CCIP then Rango; layered EOAs
Mistakes: 4,500 WEMIX left dormant; 2nd exploit reverted

Where Did the Gas Money Come From?

Step	Label	Address	Activity	What It Is
0	Upstream funder of hot wallet	0x3d87aa740dc32481494904ab94679251d5dfe51e	nonce 0 at funding time	Fed the exchange hot wallet; chain starts at exchange infrastructure.
1	Exchange Hot Wallet	0xf89d7b9c864f589bbf53a82105107622b35eaa40	123,344 transactions	Exchange hot wallet. Active since early in chain history. Sends to hundreds of addresses.
2	Gas Funder / Distribution	0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3	1,885 transactions	Distribution wallet. Funnels money from the exchange to users.
3	Attacker / Signer EOA	0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]	37 transactions	The attacker. Received $5 of gas, then struck 24 minutes later.

Key Point

The gas money came from an exchange, not from freshly created attacker wallets. This means the attacker had an exchange account and used it to fund their attack wallet. This rules out dedicated infrastructure but does not identify the attacker.

Attack Timeline -- Every Step Verified On-Chain

08:52:59 UTC | Block 118,822,162

Step 1: Attacker Wallet Funded

An exchange distribution wallet sends 23.746 WEMIX to a brand new wallet. Just enough for transaction fees.

Tx 0x5afa080282756fa24ce725ff0da2913e5d1eb5badcf83596f91257aad4f768e8 | From Gas Funder 0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3 | Amount: 23.746 WEMIX

09:14:07 UTC | Block 118,823,430

Step 2: First Attempt Fails (Nonces 0 and 1)

Attacker deploys a first version of the exploit contract and tries to call it. It self-destructs or fails. The call shows success but does nothing (0 events).

09:15:37 UTC | Block 118,823,520

Step 3: Second Attempt Also Fails (Nonce 2)

Attacker deploys a second version. Also fails. Contract no longer exists.

09:17:05 UTC | Block 118,823,608

Step 4: Third Try Works -- Router Deployed (Nonce 3)

Attacker deploys the final exploit Router (10,590 bytes). This is the brain that will call the setup function on helper contracts and run the mint/swap cycles.

Exploit Router 0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2 | 10,590 bytes

09:17:28 UTC | Block 118,823,631

🔥 Step 5: THE EXPLOIT -- 9 Cycles in One Transaction (Nonce 4)

The Router calls attack() on itself. It takes ownership of VAULT and 0x01fa (two helper contracts), then runs 9 cycles of: burn pool tokens, extract USDC, mint fresh tokens to refill. Each cycle doubles the amount. Result: 723,294 USDC.e and 4.5M WEMIX$ extracted.

Exploit tx 0xfed2172a508d84f63b56acc7e3c30164930220004f808799998b8201fe7cefe0 | Gas: 43,175,936 | 679 log events | Status: SUCCESS

09:17:48 UTC | Block 118,823,651

Step 6: Second Exploit Attempt Fails (Nonce 5)

Attacker tries to run the exploit again. It fails immediately (only 0.1% of the gas used the first time). The helper contracts are already set up, so calling the setup function again is blocked by the double-setup protection.

09:19 to 09:43 UTC | Blocks 118,823,754 to 118,825,182

Step 7: Bridging Money to Ethereum (Nonces 8-21)

Attacker sends 723,244 USDC.e to Ethereum Mainnet via 11 CCIP bridge transactions. Each costs about 6.5 WEMIX in fees. The bridge sends the money to the attacker's own address on Ethereum. All 11 sends confirmed as going to Ethereum only (no BNB Chain destination found in any of the 11 sends).

09:59 to 10:09 UTC | Blocks 118,826,166 to 118,826,740

Step 8: Dumping 4.5M WEMIX$ on DEXs (Nonces 22-31)

Attacker dumps the 4.5M WEMIX$ on decentralized exchange pools. 107K to pair #1, 391K to pair #2, and 4M to a custom swap helper that does a two-hop swap. This produces 903.78 USDC.e more.

10:22 to 10:58 UTC | Blocks 118,827,509 to 118,829,666

Step 9: Final Cash-Out to Exchange (Nonces 34-36)

34,752 WEMIX sent to two wallets: 4,500 to Dormant Cash-Out 0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5 (still sitting there, never moved) and 30,252 to Forwarder 0x14c5d965804e6d7145e0a636d7409883aeba89f0 (who forwarded everything to Suspected CEX Sink 0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c [WEMIX] [ETH], 407 nonces; legal exchange name unknown). Attacker wallet balance after all this: 0.0 WEMIX.

Complete Money Flow -- Where Every Dollar Went

Gas Funder (exch. dist.)

0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3

23.7 WEMIX

Gas money only

→

Attacker / Signer EOA

0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]

Funded

Deploy + Attack

→

Exploit Router

0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2

Runs exploit

10,590 bytes

→

WEMIX$ Token

0x8e81fcc2d4a3baa0ee9044e0d7e36f59c9bba9c1

+5,225,525 minted

Via VAULT authority

After exploit, attacker holds: 723,294 USDC.e + 4,500,366 WEMIX$

Attacker Wallet

0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]

723,294 USDC.e

→

CCIP Bridge

0x7798b795fde864f4cd1b124a38ba9619b7f8a442

11 sends

To Ethereum Mainnet only

→

Ethereum (USDC → ETH swap contract)

0x225a38bc71102999dd13478bfabd7c4d53f2dc17
0x69460570c93f9de5e2edbc3052bf10125f0ca22d

723,244 USDC → ETH

Then 73.5 ETH → BSC (Etherscan + BscScan)

Ethereum → BNB Smart Chain (traced on Etherscan + BscScan)

Attacker / Signer EOA

0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]

73.5 ETH

4 bridge txs (Rango Diamond on Etherscan)

→

ETH→BSC bridge contract

0x69460570c93f9de5e2edbc3052bf10125f0ca22d

Bridge

Bridge contract on Ethereum (Etherscan)

→

BSC Hop Wallet

0x2cf3ebd5997fa816ac57e796fea52325a374180b

USDT out

139,550 USDT to 4 EOAs

Also: 4,500,366 WEMIX$ dumped on DEXs

Attacker Wallet

0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]

4,500,366 WEMIX$

→

DEX Pools

0x42cf1af7fa9c2b50855a47806706d623de73316b
0x00caec2e118abc4c510440a8d1ac8565fec0180c

499,119 swapped

Swap Helper

0x7a9279fd5204651e2447734c0a2d8fb54373535e

4,001,246 dumped

Two-hop swap

→

More USDC.e

+903.78

Swap proceeds

Total USDC.e: 723,294 + 903.78 = 724,198.27 (matches Foundation report)

Attacker Wallet

0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]

34,752 WEMIX

From exploit + swaps

→

Dormant Cash-Out

0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5

4,500 WEMIX

Still there, never moved

Forwarder → Suspected CEX Sink

0x14c5d965804e6d7145e0a636d7409883aeba89f0 →
0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c [WEMIX] [ETH]

30,252 WEMIX

CEX name unknown; 2,473 dust left

BSC USDT split

Interpretation: Batches 90k / 20k / 10k may be pre-planned (analytical reading, not confirmed); 19,550 is remainder after gas/swap. Fresh EOAs on exploit day = nesting layers, not named CEX deposits. Recipients: see What to monitor.

Reconciliation -- Every Dollar Accounted For

What	Our Trace	Foundation Report	Match?
WEMIX$ created (net)	5,225,525.00	~5,225,525	Exact
USDC.e from exploit tx	723,294.49	--	--
USDC.e from DEX swaps	903.78	--	--
USDC.e total	724,198.27	$724,198.27	Exact Match
WEMIX sent (gross)	34,752.32	--	--
Minus CCIP fees	-72.78	--	--
Minus gas for 32 txs	-3,944	--	--
WEMIX net	~30,736	30,736 WEMIX	Exact Match

How The Exploit Worked (Plain English)

The Bug: Unlocked Setup Function

WEMIX$ does not let anyone mint new tokens. It has a whitelist of trusted helper contracts. VAULT and 0x01fa are EIP-1967 proxies with an unlocked setup path (see Architecture). Think of it as a vault door whose combination reset was still enabled: the attacker reset Ownable in proxy storage and used the already-authorized door.

The Proof: Whitelist Check

WEMIX$ has a function that checks if an address is an approved minter. We tested it by calling it directly with different addresses. The function selector is 0xc683630d, which public signature databases map to likely name isWhitelist(address). Behavior confirmed on explorers.

Label	Address	Pre-exploit whitelist?	Latest (2026-07-29)?
VAULT (helper proxy)	0xd2947dbfdbdbb99702de6e46c63cb1968e21d95b	YES (1)	NO (0) : revoked
Secondary Helper 0x01fa	0x01fa6cc8cd2f99b30e19d599fc002c3f2cac3d76	YES (1)	NO (0) : revoked
Exploit Router	0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2	NO	NO
Attacker / Signer EOA	0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]	NO	NO
WEMIX$ Owner (Foundation cold)	0x7a907b9df3f4843522b905758c2f542c9c028e4d	NO	NO

Key finding: The attacker's Router is NOT on the whitelist. It works through VAULT and 0x01fa. Both were approved by the Foundation at deployment. The attacker did not add them. The attacker took Ownable on the already-approved proxies by calling unlocked setup through them (Ownable state lives in proxy storage).

The Attack Path

Router calls initialize / reinitializer on VAULT proxy -- Ownable in proxy storage becomes Router (DELEGATECALL into VAULT impl)
Same on 0x01fa proxy -- Ownable becomes Router (different implementation behind the proxy)
Router (as proxy Ownable) drives mint via VAULT -- VAULT address is on isWhitelist, so WEMIX$ allows the mint
Router calls burn -- burns pool WEMIX$ to drain out USDC.e
Repeat 9 times, doubling each cycle: 20K, 40K, 82K, 164K, 328K, 656K, 1.3M, 2.6M, 5.2M

Important Distinction

Privileged access WAS compromised. The attacker took ownership of two Foundation-deployed helper contracts. This is a real privilege compromise. News headlines calling it an "owner key breach" are imprecise -- they describe a real problem (someone took privileged access) but attribute it to the wrong mechanism (key theft instead of configuration error). The WEMIX$ token's own owner key was never used. Helper proxy Ownable was taken through unlocked setup via the proxies. Both statements are true.

The 9 Mint/Burn Cycles -- How 5.2M Was Created

The attacker did not just mint 5.2M tokens in one shot. They ran a loop: burn existing pool WEMIX$ (pulling out USDC.e), then mint fresh WEMIX$ to refill the pool. Each cycle, the amount doubled.

Cycle	Burned	Minted	Net added
1	20,492	20,492	~0
2	20,492	40,984	+20,492
3	40,984	81,969	+40,985
4	81,969	163,938	+81,969
5	163,938	327,876	+163,938
6	327,876	655,752	+327,876
7	655,752	1,311,504	+655,752
8	1,311,504	2,623,008	+1,311,504
9	2,623,008	5,246,017	+2,623,009
TOTAL	5,246,017	10,471,542	+5,225,525

Verification

WEMIX$ total supply before exploit: 14,539,841. After exploit: 19,765,366. Change: +5,225,525. This matches the net mint-burn exactly. The "10.47M minted" number in the news is the gross amount, but it ignores the 5.25M that was burned in the same transaction.

Full Attacker Transaction Trace (All 37 Transactions)

Every single transaction the attacker made, in order. Nothing omitted.

Funding (1 transaction)

Block	Time (UTC)	From	Amount
118,822,162	08:52:59	Gas Funder `0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3`	23.746 WEMIX

Pre-Exploit: Deploy and Debug (Nonces 0-3)

Nonce	Block	Time	Action
0	118,823,430	09:14:07	Deploy version 1 -- self-destructed
1	118,823,430	09:14:07	Call version 1 -- no-op (empty contract)
2	118,823,520	09:15:37	Deploy version 2 -- also failed
3	118,823,608	09:17:05	Deploy final Router (10,590 bytes)

🔥 THE EXPLOIT (Nonce 4)

Nonce	Block	Time	Action
4	118,823,631	09:17:28	Call attack() -- 9 mint/burn cycles -- extract 723,294 USDC.e + 4.5M WEMIX$

Exploit Transaction Details

Post-Exploit: Cash Out (Nonces 5-36, 32 transactions)

Nonce	Block	Time	To	Value	Action
5	118,823,651	09:17:48	Router	0	REVERTED 2nd exploit failed
6-7	118,823,721	09:18-19	USDC.e	0	Approve USDC.e for bridge
8	118,823,754	09:19:31	CCIP	6.72	Bridge send #1 to Ethereum
9-10	118,823,919	09:22	USDC.e + V3	0	Approve + Uniswap V3 swap
11-21	118,824,055	09:24-09:43	CCIP ×10	~6.5 each	Bridge sends #2-#11 to Ethereum (total fees: 72.78 WEMIX)
22	118,826,166	09:59:43	WEMIX$	0	Transfer 107,811 WEMIX$ to DEX pair #1
23-27	118,826,171	09:59-10:00	DEX pairs	0	DEX swaps + unwrap WWEMIX
28-29	118,826,664	10:08	CREATE ×2	0	Deploy two swap helper contracts (4,519 bytes each)
30	118,826,715	10:08:52	WEMIX$	0	Transfer 4,001,246 WEMIX$ to swap helper #2
31	118,826,740	10:09:17	Helper #2	0	Run two-hop swap (WEMIX$ to WEMIX to USDC.e)
32-33	118,827,047	10:14	USDC.e + V3	0	Approve + final Uniswap V3 swap
34	118,827,509	10:22:06	Dormant Cash-Out `0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5`	4,500	Still dormant (nonce 0)
35-36	118,829,265	10:51-10:58	Forwarder `0x14c5d965804e6d7145e0a636d7409883aeba89f0`	30,252	Forwarded to Suspected CEX Sink

All Addresses and Who They Are

Grouped for readability. Full 40-hex addresses with explorer links. Analytical labels (for example, Suspected CEX sink) are not legal entity names unless an explorer tag or official WEMIX blog confirms them.

Core contracts 11

Label	Full Address	Chain	Type	Key Fact
WEMIX$ Token	0x8e81fcc2d4a3baa0ee9044e0d7e36f59c9bba9c1	WEMIX	Contract (11,666 bytes)	Stablecoin. Minter whitelist. No external CALLs. Not upgradeable.
WEMIX$ Owner (Foundation cold key)	0x7a907b9df3f4843522b905758c2f542c9c028e4d	WEMIX	EOA	Nonce 0, zero balance. Never used in exploit.
VAULT (helper proxy)	0xd2947dbfdbdbb99702de6e46c63cb1968e21d95b	WEMIX	EIP-1967 proxy (2,112 bytes)	Proxy template. Ownable=Router. isWhitelist 1→0. Impl unchanged in exploit.
Secondary Helper proxy (0x01fa)	0x01fa6cc8cd2f99b30e19d599fc002c3f2cac3d76	WEMIX	EIP-1967 proxy (2,112 bytes)	Same proxy bytecode as VAULT; different implementation. Ownable=Router. isWhitelist 1→0.
VAULT implementation	0xbddd41457b55710fd0055b1cfbbc0b9be77a89c4	WEMIX	Implementation (16,443 bytes)	EIP-1967 impl slot for VAULT. Direct owner()=0 (state in proxy).
Secondary Helper implementation	0x002ceee5624f60fee129549ffa6805a5ee49c759	WEMIX	Implementation (7,783 bytes)	EIP-1967 impl slot for 0x01fa. Not identical to VAULT impl.
Shared Proxy Admin	0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9	WEMIX	EOA (nonce 1)	EIP-1967 admin for both proxies. 0 balance. Residual upgrade surface (H12). Unlabeled.
VAULT Pre-Init Owner	0xa57440b7059b250434c3f7ce07d74b60410a2e0a	WEMIX	EOA	Owner before exploit initialize; never called initialize().
Secondary Helper Pre-Init Owner	0x0fc69c692c5e9d1eea16b53e708cb8e583e3eb63	WEMIX	EOA	Owner before exploit initialize; never called initialize().
CCIP Bridge (WEMIX3.0)	0x7798b795fde864f4cd1b124a38ba9619b7f8a442	WEMIX	Contract (11,130 bytes)	11 sends to Ethereum only (selector 5009297550715157269).
USDC.e Token (WEMIX3.0)	0x44bb111010dfffb3695f9a1b66aa879976199e7b	WEMIX	Token	Stolen value on WEMIX3.0.

Attacker path 8

Label	Full Address	Chain	Type	Key Fact
Attacker / Signer EOA	0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]	WEMIX ETH	EOA	37 txs WEMIX3.0; residual ETH on Ethereum. Wallet known; real-world person is attribution-open.
Gas Funder (exchange distribution)	0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3	WEMIX	EOA	1,885 txs. Funded attacker with 23.746 WEMIX.
Exchange Hot Wallet (upstream)	0xf89d7b9c864f589bbf53a82105107622b35eaa40	WEMIX	EOA	123,344 txs. Exchange infrastructure.
Upstream of Hot Wallet	0x3d87aa740dc32481494904ab94679251d5dfe51e	WEMIX	EOA	Funded hot wallet; nonce 0 at that point.
Exploit Router	0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2	WEMIX	Contract (10,590 bytes)	attack(). owner()=Signer. Still Ownable of VAULT + 0x01fa proxies.
Dormant Cash-Out	0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5	WEMIX	EOA	4,500 WEMIX. Nonce 0. Potentially recoverable if frozen.
Forwarder Wallet	0x14c5d965804e6d7145e0a636d7409883aeba89f0	WEMIX	EOA	Forwarded 30,252 WEMIX to sink. Nonce 2.
Suspected CEX Sink (unnamed)	0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c [WEMIX] [ETH]	WEMIX ETH	EOA	407 nonces; ~2,473 WEMIX dust. Multi-hop ETH convergence. Legal CEX name: attribution-open (Foundation/exchange/LE).

DEX / infra (WEMIX3.0) 9

Label	Full Address	Chain	Type	Key Fact
Swap Helper #1 (unused)	0xc5eff51d9f4e58d841bec56ce998e06cd6f18854	WEMIX	Contract (4,519 bytes)	Deployed, never used. Possible backup.
Swap Helper #2	0x7a9279fd5204651e2447734c0a2d8fb54373535e	WEMIX	Contract (4,519 bytes)	Two-hop swap; dumped ~4M WEMIX$.
DEX Router (WEMIX3.0)	0x5937c7096b054564c6f17b7e61d9abf1256b0593	WEMIX	Contract (17,047 bytes)	Received 723,244 USDC.e during exploit. Shared infra.
DEX Pool (WEMIX3.0)	0x34d30e02dc98122ac25f602b68c76733f3a62db6	WEMIX	Contract (31,705 bytes)	Received 953 USDC.e; held ~209.75 residual at prior audit.
USD Coin (bridged variant)	0xe3f5a90f9cb311505cd691a46596599aa1a0ad7d	WEMIX	Contract (7,544 bytes)	Swap target only. Not a WEMIX$ minter.
DEX Pair (in Router code)	0x1d3fcfb4c3e687140c836415154d311c2679d5d5	WEMIX	Pair / addr	Appears in 40+ USDC.e transfers during exploit.
DEX Pair #1	0x42cf1af7fa9c2b50855a47806706d623de73316b	WEMIX	UniV2 pair	Received 107,811 WEMIX$ dump.
DEX Pair #2	0x00caec2e118abc4c510440a8d1ac8565fec0180c	WEMIX	UniV2 pair	Received 391,307 WEMIX$ dump.
AMM Wrapper	0xe4978230413e0b4779fc18977776e87e37655bbb	WEMIX	Contract (708 bytes)	73 swap-accounting events in exploit tx.

Ethereum exit 9

Label	Full Address	Chain	Type	Key Fact
ETH USDC Release Cluster	0xc373cb40513af4a9a128e6350f2b127f5d413e88	ETH	EOA/cluster	Sent ~723,244 USDC to attacker on Ethereum post-CCIP.
ETH USDC→ETH swap contract	0x225a38bc71102999dd13478bfabd7c4d53f2dc17	ETH	Contract	USDC→ETH route on Ethereum (Etherscan).
ETH→BSC bridge contract (ETH)	0x69460570c93f9de5e2edbc3052bf10125f0ca22d	ETH	Bridge contract	Bridge contract on Ethereum (Etherscan): RangoDiamond. 73.5 ETH to BSC.
ETH Intermediate #1	0x7353e299484668ac3b8c193139b8a136ff135eaa	ETH	EOA	Received 15 ETH from signer; forwarded toward sink/others.
ETH Intermediate #2	0x3a13920f7501aa6c58476b6d278d06f312d5d431	ETH	EOA	5 ETH path toward Arbitrum Inbox.
ETH Intermediate #3	0x8f3e7a7830b8886d5ae071d012ad4c007a74bbfd	ETH	EOA	Forwarded to Suspected CEX Sink.
Arbitrum Inbox	0x4dbd4fc535ac27206064b68ffcf827b0a60bab3f	ETH	Bridge	Arbitrum Inbox contract (Etherscan label).
Post-Sink ETH Holder (2026-07-29)	0xb7f23910577b033746a29e406106ffdb50951265	ETH	EOA	Received ~21.71 ETH from Suspected CEX Sink; still holding. Unlabeled.
Post-Sink ETH Dust (2026-07-29)	0xf0bf1b911f8e33058f3dda6284eff4842b08289d	ETH	EOA	Received ~1.05 ETH from Suspected CEX Sink. Unlabeled.

BNB Smart Chain exit 6

Label	Full Address	Chain	Type	Key Fact
BSC Hop Wallet	0x2cf3ebd5997fa816ac57e796fea52325a374180b	BSC	EOA	Received Rango bridge; sent 139,550 USDT to 4 EOAs.
BSC-USD (USDT token)	0x55d398326f99059ff775485246999027b3197955	BSC	Token	BscScan-labeled Binance-Peg BSC-USD token used for hop-wallet cash-outs. Token name is an explorer label, not a claim that Binance received funds.
BSC USDT Recipient A (90k)	0x7b0a97f369b11755f0ef84cf1a61c03d8f693eba	BSC	EOA	Unlabeled. First-seen 2026-07-26. 90,000 USDT total.
BSC USDT Recipient B (20k)	0x8824e047921c699aa76b032a334107b057e2aeaa	BSC	EOA	Unlabeled. 20,000 USDT.
BSC USDT Recipient C (19.55k)	0xf72c18c6b10659ff24b33d16b458b9802f5d9ace	BSC	EOA	Unlabeled. 19,550 USDT.
BSC USDT Recipient D (10k)	0x3b1bf3403d537c92a3fbf9379891d7b9f766c071	BSC	EOA	Unlabeled. 10,000 USDT.

Key transactions 2

Label	Full Address	Chain	Type	Key Fact
Funding Transaction	0x5afa080282756fa24ce725ff0da2913e5d1eb5badcf83596f91257aad4f768e8	WEMIX	Tx hash	Gas funder to attacker, 23.746 WEMIX. Open on WEMIX explorer
Exploit Transaction	0xfed2172a508d84f63b56acc7e3c30164930220004f808799998b8201fe7cefe0	WEMIX	Tx hash	679 logs; 9 mint/burn cycles. Open on WEMIX explorer

Gap Resolution

Technical (1 to 12, 14 to 15, 17): closed on explorers and/or official blog. Attribution (13, 16): open until Foundation, exchange, or LE names a venue or person. Residual ops risk (18 / H12): Proxy Admin upgrade surface; not the July 26 mint path.

#	Question	Status	Answer
1	What is function `0xc683630d`?	SOLVED	Public signature databases say isWhitelist(address). Pre-exploit: VAULT + Secondary Helper = 1. Latest (2026-07-29): both = 0 (revoked). Name should be independently verified.
2	What is CCIP function `0x96f4e9f9`?	SOLVED	Public databases say ccipSend(...). The CCIP message receiver is the attacker's own address on Ethereum.
3	What is exploit function `0x9e5faafc`?	SOLVED	Public databases say attack().
4	What is swap helper function `0x7357f5d2`?	SOLVED	Public databases say run(uint256,uint256).
5	Who is DEX Router `0x5937c7096b054564c6f17b7e61d9abf1256b0593`?	SOLVED	DEX Router (17,047 bytes). Got 723K USDC.e. Shared infra, not attacker-controlled.
6	Who is DEX Pool `0x34d30e02dc98122ac25f602b68c76733f3a62db6`?	SOLVED	DEX pool (31,705 bytes). Got 953 USDC.e; ~209.75 residual at audit.
7	What is USD Coin variant `0xe3f5a90f9cb311505cd691a46596599aa1a0ad7d`?	SOLVED	Bridged "USD Coin". Not a WEMIX$ minter. Swap target only.
8	Who is DEX Pair `0x1d3fcfb4c3e687140c836415154d311c2679d5d5`?	SOLVED	DEX pair address in Router; 40+ USDC.e transfers during exploit.
9	Why did the 2nd exploit (nonce 5) fail?	SOLVED	Double-setup protection. The helper contracts block calling the setup function twice. Failed at the first check.
10	Did the attacker use PLAY Bridge?	SOLVED	No. None of the 37 transactions touch the PLAY Bridge.
11	Is Dormant Cash-Out `0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5` still holding funds?	SOLVED	Yes. 4,500 WEMIX, nonce 0 (live 2026-07-29). Potentially recoverable if frozen.
12	Did money go to BNB Chain?	SOLVED	Yes: second hop from Ethereum. Signer → ETH→BSC bridge contract `0x69460570c93f9de5e2edbc3052bf10125f0ca22d` (73.5 ETH) → BSC hop `0x2cf3ebd5997fa816ac57e796fea52325a374180b` → 139,550 USDT to four unlabeled EOAs. WEMIX3.0 CCIP was Ethereum-only; BNB is off WEMIX3.0. Verify on Etherscan + BscScan.
13	Which exchange got the money?	ATTRIBUTION OPEN	On-chain pattern closed; legal name open. Suspected CEX sink `0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c [WEMIX] [ETH]` (407 nonces; no public explorer name tag). Official blog: freezes requested, some venues froze addresses, names not published. To resolve: Foundation freeze list, exchange compliance reply, or LE disclosure. Do not invent a CEX name from nonce pattern alone.
14	What is function `0xae0ce498`?	BEHAVIOR-CLOSED	Still returns 2. Not found in public function-signature databases (re-checked 2026-07-29). Constant config/role enum. Exact Solidity name needs source; low priority for the case.
15	Can helpers still mint? (containment)	SOLVED (token-side)	No via current helpers. isWhitelist(VAULT)=0 and isWhitelist(0x01fa)=0. Proxy Ownable still Router. totalSupply stable. See gap 18 for Proxy Admin upgrade residual.
16	Who is the attacker in real life?	ATTRIBUTION OPEN	Wallet identified; person unknown. Attacker EOA `0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]` fully mapped (37 nonces). Funding path is exchange infrastructure, not bare attacker infra. To resolve: KYC at the gas-funding exchange, or LE on freeze/deposit accounts. Explorers cannot close this.
17	Are VAULT / 0x01fa full implementations?	SOLVED	No. EIP-1967 transparent proxies (2,112-byte identical proxy code). Distinct impls: `0xbddd41457b55710fd0055b1cfbbc0b9be77a89c4` and `0x002ceee5624f60fee129549ffa6805a5ee49c759`. Prior "full implementation" claim retracted.
18	Proxy Admin residual upgrade risk? (H12)	OPEN residual	Admin `0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9` (nonce 1, 0 bal) can upgrade both proxies. Foundation should confirm custody / rotate to multisig. Not proof of compromise. Not the July 26 mint path.

How attribution closes (checklist)

CEX name: Ask WEMIX Foundation which exchanges confirmed freezes for sink 0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c, BSC USDT recipients, and related ETH addresses. Or wait for public explorer tags that name a venue.
Person: Formal request to the exchange that funded gas (upstream of 0x23df34d2d6556a227ddc12a6c6474cb7c6edb6b3) and/or exchanges that received deposits. Requires KYC cooperation or law enforcement.
Do not: Mark a legal CEX name or person from hop counts, dust balances, or news paraphrases alone.

Last Known Points of All Stolen Funds

Asset	Amount	Last Known Location	Status
USDC → ETH	~723,244 USDC	ETH: swap contract `0x225a38bc71102999dd13478bfabd7c4d53f2dc17` → ETH legs (Etherscan)	Then Rango → BSC (73.5 ETH) + other ETH dispersals (Arbitrum path, sink hops).
USDT (BSC)	139,550	4 EOAs from BSC hop `0x2cf3ebd5997fa816ac57e796fea52325a374180b`	Largest: 90k to `0x7b0a97f369b11755f0ef84cf1a61c03d8f693eba` (unlabeled). Four EOAs look fresh on exploit day; 19,550 is the non-round remainder after 90k/20k/10k batches. Nested layers, not named exchange deposits.
USDC.e	953.78	DEX Pool `0x34d30e02dc98122ac25f602b68c76733f3a62db6`	UniV3 residual path; ~209.75 noted at prior audit.
WEMIX	4,500	Dormant Cash-Out `0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5`	Still 4,500 (live). Recoverable if frozen.
WEMIX	30,252	Suspected CEX Sink `0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c [WEMIX] [ETH]`	~2,473 WEMIX dust still there. CEX name unknown. ETH outflows 2026-07-29.
WEMIX	~3,944	Spent as gas	Gone. Not recoverable.
WEMIX	72.78	Spent as CCIP bridge fees	Gone. Not recoverable.

Bottom Line

Potentially recoverable on WEMIX3.0: 4,500 WEMIX (dormant wallet) + 2,472 WEMIX (exchange deposit dust) = ~6,972 WEMIX. Recovery depends on an exchange or the Foundation actually freezing these addresses.
Moved off-chain (Ethereum/BNB): ~724,198 USDC.e total. Foundation says some frozen (general statement).
Spent on gas/fees: ~4,017 WEMIX. Gone.

Exploit Transaction: 679 Log Events

The exploit transaction produced 679 log events from 8 contracts. Here is every type:

Event	Count	From	What It Means
Transfer	450	WEMIX$ (367), USDC.e (147)	Token movements. 9 from-zero (mints), 9 to-zero (burns), 258 other.
Approval	73	WEMIX$	Approving DEX pools to spend tokens.
AMM wrapper event	73	AMM Wrapper `0xe4978230413e0b4779fc18977776e87e37655bbb` (708 bytes)	Swap accounting. Records input, output, and fee.
Sync	19	2 DEX pairs	Reserve updates after each swap.
Swap	19	2 DEX pairs	Actual swap events.
Mint authorization	9	WEMIX$	Records who minted, how much, and which cycle (1-9).
Burn authorization	9	WEMIX$	Records who burned, how much, and which cycle.
VAULT action	9	VAULT	VAULT swap event with pool state data.
0x01fa action	9	0x01fa	Secondary helper action event.
OwnershipTransferred	2	VAULT, 0x01fa	Ownership moved from old owners to the attacker's Router.
Initialized	2	VAULT, 0x01fa	Confirms the setup function was called on both helpers.
Other setup	5	VAULT, 0x01fa	Additional setup events.

All Events Accounted For

Total: 450 + 73 + 73 + 19 + 19 + 9 + 9 + 9 + 9 + 2 + 2 + 5 = 679. Matches receipt exactly.
Minted: 10,471,542 WEMIX$. Burned: 5,246,017 WEMIX$. Net new: +5,225,525 WEMIX$.

Open residual risk (H12)

Proxy Admin residual. Token-side mint is revoked (isWhitelist=0 for VAULT and 0x01fa). Ownable on both proxies is still Exploit Router 0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2. Double-initialize blocked; totalSupply frozen at 19,765,366.

Shared Proxy Admin 0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9 (nonce 1, 0 balance) can still upgrade either proxy implementation. That is residual operational risk, not evidence the key is lost or stolen. Recommendation: Foundation confirm custody and rotate to multisig. Details: gap 18, Architecture, Watch.

What to Monitor

Movement on these addresses is an investigative lead. Sink ETH outflows on 2026-07-29 show the sink cluster was still active post-exploit (not a frozen/lost wallet narrative). Status tags below are as of that observation window.

BSC USDT recipients A-D (movement = lead): 0x7b0a97f369b11755f0ef84cf1a61c03d8f693eba (90k; WATCH), 0x8824e047921c699aa76b032a334107b057e2aeaa (20k; WATCH), 0xf72c18c6b10659ff24b33d16b458b9802f5d9ace (19.55k; WATCH), 0x3b1bf3403d537c92a3fbf9379891d7b9f766c071 (10k; WATCH)
Post-sink ETH holders (received 2026-07-29): 0xb7f23910577b033746a29e406106ffdb50951265 HOLDING (~21.71 ETH); 0xf0bf1b911f8e33058f3dda6284eff4842b08289d HOLDING (~1.05 ETH). Further outs = active management.
Dormant 0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5 DORMANT (4,500 WEMIX; wake = attacker-controlled)
Proxy Admin 0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9 WATCH ANY TX (Foundation or unknown controller)

News Claims vs. What Actually Happened

What News Said	Our Verdict	Evidence
"Owner key breach" (multiple outlets)	IMPRECISE	Privileged access WAS compromised (helper proxy Ownable taken via initialize). Configuration error, not WEMIX$ owner-key theft. Headlines describe the right problem with the wrong mechanism.
"5.23M WEMIX$ minted" (Foundation)	CORRECT (net)	Gross mint was 10.47M but 5.25M was burned in the same transaction. Net new supply: +5,225,525. Matches totalSupply() change exactly.
"10.47M minted" (third-party gross-mint headline)	MISLEADING	Correct gross number but ignores 5.25M burned in the same transaction. Net new supply is +5,225,525 (explorer totalSupply delta).
"$724,198.27 stolen" (Foundation)	EXACT MATCH	723,294.49 (exploit) + 903.78 (DEX swaps) = 724,198.27. Reconciled to the dollar.
"30,736 WEMIX converted" (Foundation)	CORRECT (net)	Our trace: 34,752 WEMIX gross. Minus 72.78 CCIP fees and ~3,944 gas = ~30,736 net.
"Funds to Ethereum and BNB Chain"	CONFIRMED	CCIP → Ethereum on-chain. ETH → BNB via ETH→BSC bridge contract (73.5 ETH) → BSC hop + 139,550 USDT outs. Traced on Etherscan + BscScan.
"Some funds to centralized exchanges"	PATTERN CONFIRMED	Forwarder → Suspected CEX Sink `0xdb3ded7731c781224ec292e2163d9554c094fd7c [WEMIX] [ETH]` (407 nonces). Legal exchange name not identified.
"CCIP was the breach vector"	NO	Zero CCIP calls in the exploit transaction. CCIP was the exit door, not the entry.
"Some exchanges froze addresses"	GENERAL STATEMENT	Official WEMIX update: freezes requested from exchanges and stablecoin issuers; some addresses reportedly frozen. Exchange legal names and amounts are not published on the official blog. Verify only via Foundation disclosures or explorer tags.
Separate July ~$724K "linked contract" incident	SAME EVENT	Outlets restating helper Ownable / linked-contract compromise as a second July loss are describing this same July 26 exploit. Official blog: ~5,225,525 WEMIX$ issued; 724,198.27 USDC.e + 30,736 WEMIX. Not a separate loss to add.

February 2025 vs July 2026 Exploits

	February 2025	July 2026
Target	Play Bridge Vault	WEMIX$ Stablecoin
How	Stolen auth key from developer repo	Unlocked contract setup function
Time to execute	~2 months inside the system	24 minutes from funding to exploit
Amount	8.65M WEMIX (~$6.1M)	$724,198 USDC.e + 30,736 WEMIX
Pattern	15 withdrawal attempts, 13 worked	9 mint/burn cycles, one transaction
Disclosure delay	~4 days	~16 hours
Root cause	Key theft (operational)	Setup error (contract design)
Attacker known?	Not disclosed	Wallet identified, person unknown
Attacker overlap testable?	2025 addresses not disclosed	2026 wallet mapped; comparison blocked until 2025 set is public

How to Verify These Claims Yourself

Every claim in this report can be checked by anyone with access to the WEMIX3.0 network. Here are the key checks:

Claim	How to Check	Expected Result
WEMIX$ owner never sent a transaction	Check the transaction count (nonce) of `0x7a907b9df3f4843522b905758c2f542c9c028e4d`	Nonce = 0
WEMIX$ owner has zero balance	Check the WEMIX balance of WEMIX$ Owner `0x7a907b9df3f4843522b905758c2f542c9c028e4d`	0.0
VAULT whitelist pre vs latest	Call `0xc683630d` on WEMIX$ `0x8e81fcc2d4a3baa0ee9044e0d7e36f59c9bba9c1` with VAULT `0xd2947dbfdbdbb99702de6e46c63cb1968e21d95b` at block 118823630 vs latest	pre=1, latest=0 (revoked)
Secondary Helper whitelist pre vs latest	Same with `0x01fa6cc8cd2f99b30e19d599fc002c3f2cac3d76`	pre=1, latest=0 (revoked)
Exploit Router is NOT an approved minter	isWhitelist(Router) on WEMIX$	Returns 0
WEMIX$ Owner is NOT an approved minter	isWhitelist(Owner)	Returns 0
VAULT / 0x01fa proxy Ownable still Router	owner() `0x8da5cb5b` on both proxies	Both return Exploit Router `0xb6bdea4941f6fd4ea3918fac902494da100ac4d2`
Pre-init owners (forensics)	owner() at block 118823630	VAULT → `0xa57440b7059b250434c3f7ce07d74b60410a2e0a`; Secondary Helper → `0x0fc69c692c5e9d1eea16b53e708cb8e583e3eb63`
Total supply changed by exactly 5,225,525	Call `totalSupply()` (selector `0x18160ddd`) on WEMIX$ at block 118823630 and block 118823631	14,539,841 before, 19,765,366 after, delta = +5,225,525
Exploit transaction has 679 log events	Get the receipt for transaction 0xfed2172a508d84f63b56acc7e3c30164930220004f808799998b8201fe7cefe0	679 logs, status = success
All 11 CCIP sends went to Ethereum only	Nonces 8, 11-21 to CCIP Bridge `0x7798b795fde864f4cd1b124a38ba9619b7f8a442`	Chain selector 5009297550715157269 (Ethereum)
ETH→BNB via Rango	Ethereum: signer → ETH→BSC bridge contract `0x69460570c93f9de5e2edbc3052bf10125f0ca22d` (73.5 ETH)	BSC hop `0x2cf3ebd5997fa816ac57e796fea52325a374180b`
Attacker wallet is empty	Check the balance and nonce of `0xc921a66e30745f11f8c7a7870e95640607ae7ea2 [WEMIX] [ETH]`	Balance = 0, nonce = 37
VAULT is EIP-1967 proxy	eth_getStorageAt impl slot `0x360894a1...` on VAULT	Impl = `0xbddd41457b55710fd0055b1cfbbc0b9be77a89c4`
0x01fa is EIP-1967 proxy (different impl)	Same slot on 0x01fa	Impl = `0x002ceee5624f60fee129549ffa6805a5ee49c759`
Shared Proxy Admin	eth_getStorageAt admin slot `0xb5312768...` on both	`0x465ea8f2dea0061dc177d4325ece33a0151af3f9`; nonce 1
Dormant wallet still holds 4,500 WEMIX	Check the balance of `0x2b723ed7ad47b060bf56ab0928596d7d024d26d5`	4,500 WEMIX, nonce = 0

Note on Function Names

Function names like isWhitelist(address), attack(), ccipSend(), and run(uint256,uint256) come from public signature databases. These databases match function selectors (4-byte hashes) to known function signatures. Collisions are possible. The behavior of each function was confirmed by direct testing, but the exact names should be independently verified.